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WHY THE PATENTLY OFFENSIVE JUST BECAME 
MORE EXPENSIVE: THE “POLE TAX” AND THE 
TEXAS SUPREME COURT’S EXPANSION OF THE 
SECONDARY-EFFECTS DOCTRINE IN COMBS V. 
TEXAS ENTERTAINMENT ASS’N 
Frances Taylor Bishop+  
In the words of Justice John Marshall Harlan, “surely it will not be said to be 
a part of any one’s liberty, as recognized by the supreme law of the land, that 
he shall be allowed to introduce into commerce . . . an element that will be 
confessedly injurious to the public morals.”1  But what if that element is 
speech, or, what if it is expressive speech—what would Justice Harlan say 
then?  In Combs v. Texas Entertainment Ass’n, the Texas Supreme Court sided 
with the government (and potentially Justice Harlan) in holding that the 
Sexually Oriented Business Fee Act (SOBFA) is constitutional.2  The SOBFA 
taxes businesses that offer the combination of nude dancing and alcohol and 
intends to curb the negative secondary effects of such businesses.3  By 
extending the application of the secondary-effects doctrine beyond zoning 
ordinances and public-indecency regulations to the realm of taxation, the Texas 
Court opened a Pandora’s Box of potential secondary-effects legislation aimed 
at eliminating activities deemed to create a “widespread pestilence.”4 
                       
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.A., 2008, James Madison University.  The author wishes to thank Professor Mark Rienzi for his 
insight and investment in her success, Professor Antonio F. Perez for an invaluable foundation in 
constitutional law, and her colleagues on the Catholic University Law Review for their dedication 
to this Note.  The author is also grateful to her family, whose love and support made her the 
person she is today.  Lastly, the author dedicates this Note in loving memory of Aidan Charles, 
whose laugh made the world a better place. 
 1. Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 357 (1903). 
 2. 347 S.W.3d 277, 278 (Tex. 2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 1146 (2012). 
 3. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 102.052 (West Supp. 2011); see Rachel E. Morse, 
Note, Resisting the Path of Least Resistance: Why the Texas “Pole Tax” and the New Class of 
Modern Sin Taxes Are Bad Policy, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 189, 191–92 (2009) (referring to 
the “Texas ‘Pole’ Tax” as a “sin tax,” or a tax which seeks to assess costs based on the disfavored 
nature of the good or service).  Morse argues that sin taxes highlight class distinctions in America 
by placing an undue burden on lower-income individuals and small businesses.  Id. at 192.  Morse 
notes, however, that despite this disparate impact, sin taxes are generally supported by the public 
because sin taxes are associated with “programs purported to cure the ills caused by the activity 
being taxed.”  Id. (noting that individuals are more likely to turn a blind eye if they are not one of 
the select few negatively impacted by the tax). 
 4. Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 357; see infra text accompanying notes 138–39 (describing 
the harms of expanding the secondary-effects doctrine); see also note 14 (providing examples of 
traditional zoning and public-indecency regulations). 
1184 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:1183 
At first glance, the constitutional admonition, “Congress shall make no law 
abridging the freedom of speech,”5 appears in terms too absolute to admit 
ambiguity.  However, the United States Supreme Court’s colorful First 
Amendment jurisprudence proves the opposite.6  During the early development 
of free-speech jurisprudence, the Court addressed the meaning of “speech” and 
established vague criteria to determine what speech is afforded First 
Amendment protection.7  Attempts at constitutional line-drawing became more 
complex as the Court began to distinguish between ordinary conduct that falls 
squarely within the realm of government regulation, and expressive conduct 
that falls within the safety of the First Amendment.8  However, one bright-line 
rule did emerge—the Court declared that obscenity was clearly outside the 
scope of the First Amendment.9  Speech qualifying as obscene generally lacks 
social importance or a tangible contribution and portrays sexual or 
pornographic material in an offensive manner.10 
Today, the judicially created secondary-effects doctrine permits many 
content-based regulations11 that would otherwise be held  
                       
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 6. See generally THOMAS L. TEDFORD & DALE A. HERBECK, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE 
UNITED STATES (4th ed. 2001) (providing an evolution of First Amendment case law); JOHN F. 
WIRENIUS, FIRST AMENDMENT, FIRST PRINCIPLES: VERBAL ACTS AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
(rev. ed. 2004) (focusing in-depth on the development of the First Amendment). 
 7. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (articulating the “clear and 
present danger” standard and noting that such words are not protected by the First Amendment); 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1931) (invalidating a prohibition that reached the 
purely symbolic speech of flag burning); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573–74 
(1942) (holding that “fighting words” are outside the scope of First Amendment protection and, 
accordingly, are capable of being regulated). 
 8. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (enunciating the infamous 
“O’Brien Test” that applies to the regulation of conduct that incidentally restricts speech). 
Expressive conduct differs from “conduct” per se, in that it combines nonverbal conduct with an 
element of symbolism.  See James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind 
to Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 2–4, nn.8–10 (2008) (noting the practice of distinguishing between 
“pure speech,” expressive conduct or “speech plus,” and mere conduct alone). 
 9. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485  (1957).  Some scholars have realized a 
dichotomy between obscenity’s prominent place in American culture and the Court’s rigid view 
of obscene speech as unworthy of First Amendment protection.  See FRED R. BERGER, FREEDOM, 
RIGHTS AND PORNOGRAPHY 132 (Bruce Russell ed., 1991) (“An observer of American attitudes 
toward pornography faces a bewildering duality: on the one hand, we buy and read and view 
more of it than just about anyone else, while, on the other hand we seek to suppress it as hard as 
anybody else.”). 
 10. See Francis Marsico III, Note, The Fate of Indecency? The Constitutional Issue 
Presented by Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 21 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1033, 1050 (2011) (describing the general 
characterization of obscenity as lacking any “redeeming social importance”). 
 11. Content-based regulations are restrictions on communications “because of the message 
it conveys.”  Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47 (1987).  
Content-based regulations are virtually always held invalid by reviewing courts because such 
regulations are subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.  Id. at 47–48.  On the other hand, a  
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unconstitutional.12  Essentially, the secondary-effects doctrine enables courts to 
categorize certain regulations that would otherwise be viewed as targeting the 
suppression of content as content-neutral, and accordingly apply an 
intermediate level of scrutiny.13  Historically, the secondary-effects doctrine 
had been limited to zoning ordinances and public-indecency statutes.14  
However, in Texas Entertainment Ass’n, the Texas Supreme Court applied the  
secondary-effects doctrine to taxes on sexually oriented businesses offering 
nude dancing with alcohol.15  The court reasoned that because the statute 
targets the negative secondary effects of nude dancing, such as sexual abuse, 
rather than regulates the expressive conduct of nude dancing, SOBFA is a 
constitutional restriction on free speech.16 
This Note analyzes the Texas Supreme Court’s application of the  
secondary-effects doctrine in determining the constitutionality of SOBFA, 
which imposes a five dollar per-customer tax on sexually oriented businesses.17  
Part I discusses the Court’s foundational First Amendment jurisprudence and 
its attempt to define the scope of free speech protection.  This Note then 
addresses the Court’s struggle to articulate a concrete definition for obscenity 
and the proper regulation of so-called symbolic speech.  In doing so, this Note 
emphasizes the critical distinction between content-neutral and content-based 
legislation.  Next, this Note discusses the emergence and evolution of the 
secondary-effects doctrine in the context of the Court’s modern content 
jurisprudence.  This Note next explores the Texas lower courts’ decisions on 
                                                    
content-neutral restriction “limit[s] expression without regard to the content or communicative 
impact of the message conveyed.”  Id. at 48.  These types of regulations are subjected to a lower 
standard of review.  Id. at 48–50.  At least one circuit has held that time-place-manner restrictions 
that are content-neutral and, thus, subject to intermediate scrutiny, include those aimed at the 
“undesirable secondary effects of sexually explicit expression.”  Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 
107 F.3d 164, 172 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
 12. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (finding the 
regulations in question to be a “valid governmental response to the ‘admittedly serious problems’ 
created by adult theaters”). 
 13. See Christopher J. Andrew, Note, The Secondary Effects Doctrine: The Historical 
Development, Current Application, and Potential Mischaracterization of an Elusive Judicial 
Precedent, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1175–76 (2002) (noting that “[w]hat was once considered 
an obscure and limited doctrine confined to adult entertainment regulations is now an integral part 
of First Amendment jurisprudence”); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: 
Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 797 (2007) 
(noting that the secondary-effects doctrine is at odds with First Amendment jurisprudence 
because regulations of sexual speech clearly regulate speech because of its content). 
 14. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 283 (2000) (public indecency); 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563 (1991) (public indecency); Renton, 475 U.S. at 
43 (zoning); Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976) (zoning). 
 15. Combs v. Tex. Entm’t Ass’n, 347 S.W.3d 277, 278 (Tex. 2011) (quoting TEX. BUS.  
& COM. CODE ANN. §§ 102.051(2), 102.052(a) (West Supp. 2011)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1146 
(2012). 
 16. Id. at 287–88. 
 17. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 102.052(a). 
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the constitutionality of SOBFA before analyzing the final disposition on the 
issue by the Texas Supreme Court.  Finally, this Note argues that the Texas 
Supreme Court was incorrect to extend the secondary-effects doctrine beyond 
zoning ordinances. 
I.  EVOLUTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH 
A.  Defining the Scope and Outer Limits of Constitutionally Protected Free 
Speech and Expression Under the First Amendment 
1.  Establishment of the “Clear and Present Danger” Test 
In Schenck v. United States, Charles Schenck challenged his conviction for 
conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act, which arose from his distribution of 
pamphlets designed to foster draft resistance.18  Schenck argued that the 
Espionage Act abridged his First Amendment right to speech and press.19  The 
Court recognized that Schenck’s speech would have enjoyed constitutional 
protections “in ordinary times;”20  however, the Court reasoned that an 
individual’s rights must be considered within the particular context of the 
activity.21  In doing so, Justice Holmes articulated the foundational “clear and 
present danger” test:  
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in 
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and 
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent.  It is a question of proximity and 
degree.22 
One week after Schenck, the Court added a higher evidentiary burden to the 
“clear and present danger” test in Debs v. United States, a similar case in 
which the defendant was convicted of violating the Espionage Act.23  Justice 
Holmes affirmed the defendant’s conviction and noted that a guilty verdict 
needed to be predicated on both a finding of specific intent to cause obstruction 
                       
 18. 249 U.S. 47, 48–49, 51 (1919) (quoting the pamphlets’ language encouraging those 
subjected to the draft to “do [their] share to maintain, support, and uphold the rights of the people 
of this country”). 
 19. Id. at 49.  The Espionage Act of 1917 makes it a crime to “willfully cause or attempt to 
cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, . . . [or] willfully obstruct the 
recruiting or enlistment service.”  PUB. L. NO. 65-24, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (emphasis added). 
 20. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
 21. Id. (citing Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 205–06 (1904)). 
 22. Id. (emphasis added) (noting that a statement that would go unnoticed in times of peace 
may not be tolerated in times of war because of the threat the statement poses to the nation). 
 23. 249 U.S. 211, 211–12 (1919).  Debs was indicted for a public speech espousing 
socialism and decrying the oppression of the working class, particularly in times of war.  Id. at 
212–13.  The Court found that Debs urged the crowd to realize that “the master class has always 
declared the war and the subject class has always fought the battles.”  Id. at 213. 
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to the Armed recruiting services, and on a reasonable probability that such 
obstruction would be the natural result of the speech at issue.24   
2.  “Every Idea is an Incitement”? 
Before 1925, the Court’s free-speech jurisprudence required a showing of an 
imminent threat of incitement before limiting an individual’s free speech.25  In 
Gitlow v. New York, the court re-interpreted the meaning of “imminent” to 
include the unforeseeable future consequences of certain speech.26  The Gitlow 
Court considered the constitutionality of a state criminal anarchy statute 
prohibiting advocacy for the overthrow of the government.27  In the case, 
Benjamin Gitlow was charged with criminal anarchy as a result of his 
distribution of a pamphlet entitled “The Left Wing Manifesto.”28  The Court 
held that the regulation of speech that advocates, even indirectly, for the 
overthrow of government is a legitimate exercise of the government’s police 
power.29  The Court was troubled by small, unforeseeable predictions of 
incitement and rebellion as a reason to prohibit speech, noting that “[a] single 
revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst 
into a sweeping and destructive conflagration.”30  Justice Holmes, joined by 
Justice Louis Brandeis, authored a dissenting opinion stressing the necessity 
for a “present danger” to justify a constitutional abridgment of such speech.31  
                       
 24. Id. at 216.  Less than a year later, in yet another Espionage Act case, Justice Holmes 
dissented, disagreeing with the majority’s conclusion on what constitutes an intentional act.  See 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the 
majority’s conclusion that the leaflets in question represented an intentional act to warrant 
conviction under the Espionage Act).  Justice Holmes argued that although an actor may be aware 
of the likely consequences of his speech, mere awareness does not rise to the level of specific 
intent.  Id. at 627.  In his opinion, Justice Holmes referred to the defendant’s publication as a 
“silly leaflet by an unknown man” with the sole purpose of preventing American interference 
with the Russian Revolution.  Id. at 628–29.  Stressing that the First Amendment protects efforts 
to “change the minds of the country,” Justice Holmes warned: “[W]e should be eternally vigilant 
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with 
death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing 
purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.”  Id. at 630 
(emphasis added).   But see Russell L. Weaver, Brandenburg and Incitement in a Digital Era, 80 
MISS. L.J. 1263, 1265 (2011) (arguing that the threat of terrorism combined with the expansive 
reach of the Internet requires a more lenient standard for evaluating the effects of “subversive 
advocacy”).  For a more comprehensive account of Abrams, see generally RICHARD POLENBERG, 
FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH (Cornell Univ. 
Press 1999). 
 25. See supra notes 18–24. 
 26. 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925). 
 27. Id. at 654. 
 28. Id. at 655; see also The Left Wing Manifesto, REVOLUTIONARY AGE, July 5, 1919, at 6, 
available at http://www.marxist.org/history/usa/pubs/revolutionaryage/v2n01-jul-05-1919.pdf. 
 29. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 670. 
 30. Id. at 669. 
 31. Id. at 672–73 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Holmes observed that all opinions have the inherent potential to spread 
and gain support,32 implicitly warning that a departure from the limited “clear 
and present danger” standard would improperly narrow the scope of 
constitutionally protected speech.33   
In Stromberg v. California, the Court heeded Justice Holmes’s warning by 
finding a California statute that banned the display of red flags to be an 
unconstitutional violation of the freedom of expression guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.34  The Court reasoned that criminalizing the display 
of red flags as a symbol of government opposition punished wholly legal 
conduct that is vital to the functioning of democracy.35  The Stromberg Court’s 
holding curbed the prevailing trend of limiting First Amendment rights and 
laid the foundation for the Court’s recognition of symbolic speech.36  
                       
 32. See id. at 673 (noting that “[t]he only difference between the expression of an opinion 
and an incitement . . . is the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result”). 
 33. Id. (noting that if speech may be suppressed merely for its tendency to “incite,” little 
would remain within the ambit of the First Amendment because “[e]very idea is an incitement”). 
 34. 283 U.S. 359, 361, 369 (1931) (noting that a statute, which criminalizes the display of a 
flag as a sign or symbol of opposition to the government, is contrary to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection of free expression). 
 35. Id. at 369 (“The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end 
that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by 
lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle 
of our constitutional system.”); see Matthew Alan Cherep, Comment, Barbie Can Get a Tattoo, 
Why Can’t I?: First Amendment Protection of Tattooing in a Barbie World, 46 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 331, 335 (2011) (stressing that symbolic speech dramatically contributes to social dialogue 
and arguing that the failure to protect such expression “could stifle societal discourse and cultural 
advancement”). 
 36. See Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369–70 (acknowledging the display of red flags as a form of 
symbolic speech protected by the Constitution).  However, Stromberg did not extinguish the 
“incitement” doctrine completely, as evidenced by Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 
(1942).  In Chaplinsky, a New Hampshire statute prohibited the use of “offensive, divisive, [and,] 
annoying” words or names directed at another individual in public.  315 U.S. at 569.  In the case, 
Walter Chaplinsky called a city marshal a “damned Fascist,” among other things, and was 
subsequently convicted for his actions under the New Hampshire statute.  Id.  In responding to 
Chaplinsky’s First Amendment claim of protection, the Court remarked: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention 
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
“fighting” words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace. 
Id. at 571–72 (footnote omitted).  In this case, the Court held that the statute fit into this limited 
class and was not an unconstitutional abridgment of speech because it only prohibited words a 
man of “common intelligence”  would understand to “cause an average [person] to fight.”  Id. at 
573; but cf. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949) (invalidating a “breach of the 
peace” ordinance that punished any speech that “stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or 
brought about a condition of unrest” and noting that an opposite result would “lead to the 
standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community 
groups”). 
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3.  Obscenity: “I Know It when I See It” 
Whereas the Court’s general treatment of constitutionally protected free 
speech began to take shape, legal rights concerning obscenity lagged behind as 
the Court struggled to articulate a functional definition. The Court’s early First 
Amendment obscenity cases focused primarily on identifying whether or not 
material was “obscene.”37  This demarcation was of particular importance 
because, as noted in Roth v. United States, once material was deemed obscene 
it was no longer “within the area of constitutionally protected speech or 
press.”38  In Roth, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a federal 
obscenity statute that prohibited the mailing of obscene materials.39  The 
Court’s reading of the history of the First Amendment led it to conclude that 
obscenity is not afforded First Amendment protection because it is “utterly 
without redeeming social importance.”40  The Court described obscenity as 
“material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to the prurient 
interest.”41  
Subsequently, in Jacobellis v. Ohio, the Court further refined its definition 
of obscenity when it held that a French film, entitled “Les Amants,” was 
improperly categorized as obscene.42  The Jacobellis Court, holding that the 
film was entitled to First Amendment protection, emphasized that a state may 
not proscribe the public display of a motion picture unless the film is “utterly 
                       
 37. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 132 (stating that prior to the Roth era, there was no clear 
legal definition of obscenity due the absence of obscenity litigation in our “common-law 
background”). 
 38. 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), overruled on other grounds, Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188, 193–94 (1977); see TERRENCE J. MURPHY, CENSORSHIP: GOVERNMENT AND OBSCENITY 24 
(1963) (stating that courts could not interpret the validity of obscenity statutes without first 
identifying obscenity’s meaning). 
 39. Roth, 354 U.S. at 479 & n.1.  Roth’s business involved the mailing of advertising 
materials to generate interest in the publications offered in his store.  Id. at 480. 
 40. Id. at 483–84 (noting that despite the lack of depth in obscenity law at the time of the 
First Amendment’s adoption, there existed adequate evidence that the First Amendment was not 
intended to extend to obscenity) (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952)). 
 41. Id. at 487 (quoting with approval the trial court’s jury instruction that applied a general 
community-based standard for determining pruriency).  The Roth court almost entirely adopted 
the American Law Institute’s model definition of obscenity, the purpose of which was explained 
in an official comment: 
Obscenity is defined in terms of material which appeals predominantly to prurient 
interest. . . . “Appeal to prurient interest” refers to qualities of the material itself; the 
capacity to attract individuals eager for a forbidden look behind the curtain of privacy 
which our customs draw about sexual matters.  Psychiatrists and anthropologists see the 
ordinary person in our society as caught between normal sex drives and curiosity, on 
the one hand, and powerful social and legal prohibitions against overt sexual behavior.  
The principal objective of [the model obscenity statute] is to prevent commercial 
exploitation of this psychosexual tension. 
MURPHY, supra note 38, at 27 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE, § 207.10 cmt. 2.A (Tentative Draft 
No. 6 1957)). 
 42. 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (plurality opinion). 
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without redeeming social importance.”43  In adhering to the admittedly 
imperfect obscenity test from Roth, the Court emphasized that the mere 
portrayal of sex, alone, is not enough to bring the film outside the scope of the 
First Amendment.44  But, perhaps the most accurate representation of the 
Court’s threshold for obscenity was articulated by Justice Potter Stewart’s 
poignant comment: “I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in 
this case is not that.”45 
B.  Characterization and Fine-Tuning the Substantive Protections Afforded by 
Freedoms of Speech and Expression 
1.  Obscene, but with Redeeming Social Value 
With the outer limits of free speech coming into focus with a foundational, 
albeit imperfect, test for determining obscenity in place, the Court shifted its 
focus to the social value of otherwise obscene speech.46  In Memoirs v. 
Massachusetts, the Court reversed the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 
holding that a book chronicling the life of a prostitute was not obscene—even 
though it appealed to the “prurient interest” and was “patently offensive.”47  
Using the test articulated in Roth, the Court found that the book was not 
“utterly without redeeming social value,” noting that although the commercial 
success of material pertaining to sexual subject matter is more likely 
attributable to its sexual character, the social worth of the book must be 
evaluated in a holistic manner so as to consider even a “modicum of literary 
and historical value.”48  In reaching its decision, the Court rejected a balancing 
test, opining that a work’s legitimate social value, however slight, cannot 
                       
 43. Id. at 191 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 484). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 46. See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470–71 (1966) (finding a publisher’s 
intent for “titillation,” instead of “intellectual content,” a critical factor in determining obscenity 
under Roth); see also Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 231 (1972) (per curiam) (noting that 
although a “quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book will not constitutionally redeem an 
otherwise obscene publication,” the photographs and poem at issue were constitutionally 
protected because they related to the broader theme of the publication, and at least represented 
“the earmarks of an attempt at serious art”). 
 47. A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General 
of Massachusetts (Memoirs v. Massachusetts), 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (plurality opinion) 
(determining that it was erroneous to hold that “a book need not be ‘unqualifiedly worthless 
before it can be deemed obscene’”), overruled on other grounds by Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15 (1973), as stated in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 194 (1977). 
 48. Id. at 419–21.  Similarly, the private possession of otherwise obscene material without a 
commercial motivation also falls within the domain of legally protected speech and expression.  
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (recognizing an individual’s constitutional right 
of access to and possession of obscene materials in the privacy of his or her own home); see also 
Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 426 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he First Amendment does not permit the 
censorship of expression not brigaded with illegal action.”). 
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depend upon a governmental interest in regulating its prurient or offensive 
aspects.49 
2.  Replacing the Social Value Test with a More Flexible Obscenity Standard   
The Court soon recognized that the social value test, wherein the slightest 
contribution to society precluded material from being labeled as obscene, 
created a rarely attainable obscenity standard.50  In Miller v. California, the 
Court acknowledged that limiting restrictions of obscene speech to only that 
which was “utterly without social value” erected a bar that would seldom be 
met under the Court’s evidentiary standards.51  Because nearly all allegedly 
obscene material contains expressive elements with, arguably, some social 
value, the previous standard proved impractical and was abandoned.52  In its 
place, the Court adopted a new three-part test, directing the trier of fact to 
consider: 
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.53 
Notably, the Court expressly rejected a “national standard” for evaluating 
obscenity, focusing instead on community standards.54  Effectively, this 
language helped to support future local ordinances that restrict sexually 
oriented businesses by introducing an element of deference to  
community-legislative decisions.55  
In Paris Adult Theatre I. v. Slaton, a companion case to Miller, the Court 
held that state governments had a “legitimate interest in regulating commerce 
in obscene material and . . . [the] exhibition of obscene material in places of 
public accommodation.”56  The case was remanded for determination in 
accordance with the new obscenity standard articulated in Miller and in 
                       
 49. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 419. 
 50. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21–22 (1973). 
 51. Id. at 22; see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 194 (1977) (“Clearly it was thought 
that some conduct which would have gone unpunished under Memoirs would result in conviction 
under Miller.”). 
 52. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). 
 53. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 231 U.S. 229, 230 (1972) (per 
curiam)). 
 54. Id. at 37. 
 55. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 133 (noting that one often-asserted justification for  
local regulation of pornographic material is that “irrespective of its morality, a practice which 
most people in a community find abhorrent and disgusting may be rightfully suppressed”). 
 56. 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (referring to the display of obscene films in adult movie 
theaters). 
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accordance with the local-community standards.57  Combined, these two cases 
laid the foundation for future battles over increasing local regulations aimed at 
sexually oriented business—including movie theaters and nude-dancing 
establishments.58  
3. Symbolic Speech and the Regulation of Conduct: “One Man’s Vulgarity 
is Another Man’s Lyric” 
In addition to the arduous process of formulating a workable obscenity 
standard, the Court grappled with the issue of expressive speech in the form of 
non-verbal conduct.  In United States v. O’Brien, the Court upheld a federal 
conviction for the destruction of draft cards against a First Amendment 
challenge.59   Defendant David Paul O’Brien argued that the federal statute 
unconstitutionally violated his freedom of expression by criminalizing the 
symbolic burning of his registration papers.60  The Court held that when an 
individual’s conduct contains both speech and non-speech elements, a statute 
aimed solely at the non-speech elements may excuse secondary limitations of 
otherwise protected expression.61  Thus, because the statute was solely 
intended to prevent the physical destruction of registration papers (the  
non-speech component of O’Brien’s speech), it was incidentally justified in 
restricting the symbolic message O’Brien wished to convey by burning the 
papers.62   This decision established the “O’Brien test” for evaluating the 
constitutionality of restrictions within the speech/non-speech dichotomy.63   
The test provides that: 
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within 
the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.64   
                       
 57. Id. at 70. 
 58. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991) (plurality) (nude 
dancing), abrogated in part by City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000); Young v. 
Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62–63 (1976) (adult movie theaters); Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211–12 (1975) (nudity shown at drive-in theater). 
 59. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 60. Id.  O’Brien claimed that the burning of his draft papers deserved protection because his 
actions symbolized his disagreement with the war and the draft.  Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 376–77. 
 63. See id. at 382 (finding that O’Brien’s conduct threatened the Selective Service System’s 
daily operation, and therefore warranted incidental limitations on the expressive elements of his 
non-verbal speech). 
 64. Id. at 377.  The four-prong O’Brien test is considered to be “the definitive doctrinal 
statement” in the realm of symbolic speech.  See Bhagwat, supra note 13, at 791–92. 
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The Court in O’Brien found that the statute at issue furthered the government’s 
interest in maintaining the integrity and future availability of draft 
registrations, and had minimal effects on O’Brien’s expressive rights.65  Thus, 
the Court determined the statute satisfied all four prongs of the test.66  The 
O’Brien test has special relevance in the context of obscenity regulations, as 
those ordinances deemed content-neutral through the application of the 
secondary-effects doctrine receive the benefit of intermediate scrutiny.67 
C.  The Content-Neutrality Theme and the Court’s Special Niche for All Things 
Obscene 
1.  Content-Neutral “Time—Place—Manner” Restrictions 
In the years following O’Brien, the Court began to carve out exceptions for 
regulations of constitutionally protected speech.68  For example, in Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, the Court upheld a New York City ordinance that 
regulated sound control at a popular venue in Central Park.69  In the case, Rock 
Against Racism, a frequent sponsor of concerts, filed suit alleging the sound 
guidelines violated the First Amendment.70  The Court reasoned that, as long 
as the regulations are “justified without reference to the content of regulated 
speech . . . the government may impose reasonable restrictions on time, place, 
or manner of protected speech.”71  In assessing content-neutrality, the Court 
                       
 65. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382.  Defining what constitutes regulation of “conduct” as opposed 
to communicative aspects of speech can be challenging, as illustrated in Cohen v. California, 403 
U.S. 15 (1971).  In Cohen, the Court reversed a conviction for breach of the peace based on a 
jacket depicting the words “Fuck the Draft.”  Id. at 16–17.  Justice John Marshall Harlan, writing 
for the majority, noted that because Cohen’s conviction resulted solely from the offensiveness of 
the words “Fuck the Draft,” the government sought to regulate the communicative aspects of the 
speech.  Id. at 18.  As a result, the government could not receive the benefit of the O’Brien test, 
which is limited to regulation aimed at the non-communicative aspects of speech.  Justice Harlan 
observed that allowing the government to prohibit the use of certain inflammatory words would 
create a tool designed to censor, which could lead to a slippery slope toward the extinguishment 
of unpopular ideas.  Id. at 26. See ARCHIBALD COX, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 50–57 (1981) for 
a scholarly discussion analyzing Justice Harlan’s opinion in Cohen. 
 66. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382. 
 67. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 68. See infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
 69. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784 (1989).  The guidelines required 
sponsors to agree to use equipment and sound technicians provided by the city.  Id.  New York 
City implemented the sound guidelines in response to complaints regarding the excessive volume 
level in the vicinity of the Central Park area, which included an area reserved for peaceful and 
recreational use.  Id. at 785. 
 70. Id. at 784. 
 71. Id. at 791 (providing that the regulations must also be “‘narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.’” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 
U.S. 288, 293 (1984))); see Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (noting the Court’s approval of time, place, or manner restrictions); see 
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noted that the critical distinction is “whether the government has adopted a 
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”72  
In this case, because the government’s purpose for enacting the guidelines was 
confined to sound control, and not the suppression of any particular idea, the 
Court upheld the regulation as constitutionally valid.73  
2.  The Emergence of the Secondary-Effects Doctrine 
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a content-based ordinance, under the auspices of the 
secondary-effects doctrine, by classifying it as content-neutral.74  The case 
involved an ordinance that prohibited the operation of adult movie theaters 
located within 1,000 feet of residential areas, schools, parks, or churches.75  
The Ninth Circuit struck down the ordinance, finding that the ordinance was 
related to the suppression of speech, and that the government failed to establish 
                                                    
also Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
113, 116 (1982) (explaining that time, place, or manner restrictions are less controversial than 
content-based regulations because they “presume the existence of alternative avenues of 
expression”). 
 72. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 
U.S. at 295) (holding that a National Park Service regulation prohibiting demonstrators from 
sleeping did not violate the First Amendment); cf. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 
94–95 (1972) (holding that a city ordinance prohibiting peaceful picketing near school grounds, 
with the exception of peaceful labor picketing, was unconstitutional because it used the subject 
matter of the picketing as the criterion to determine lawful and unlawful picketing). 
 73. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 792–93.  A few years later, the Court addressed the 
same issue in a markedly different statute from St. Paul, Minnesota, that criminalized the display 
of “symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including but not limited to, a burning 
cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, 
alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.”  R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (quoting ST. PAUL LEGIS. Code § 292.02 (1990)).  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected a challenge that the ordinance was overbroad because of its 
limitation to conduct that “arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others.”  Id. at 380–81 (citing In 
re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991)).  The United States Supreme Court 
disagreed with the Minnesota Court’s characterization of fighting words by stressing that it is the 
non-speech elements of fighting words that remove them from First Amendment protection.  Id. 
at 386.  Even accepting the Minnesota Supreme Court’s limiting construction, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the law was facially unconstitutional because its prohibition on the use 
of fighting words applied only if the speaker was motivated by one or more of the enumerated 
biases.  Id. at 391.  In other words, the Court found that the St. Paul ordinance discriminated on 
the basis of content and viewpoint by intending to prohibit the underlying  
message—or motive—that was being conveyed, instead of being concerned with the danger 
associated with fighting words.  Id. at 391–93.  See generally Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. 
Commc’n Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 641–43 (1994) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the 
principles and policies underlying the content-neutrality inquiry of First Amendment 
jurisprudence). 
 74. 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986). 
 75. Id. 
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a substantial interest for enacting the restriction.76  The Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit, classifying the Renton ordinance as  
“content-neutral” because it targeted only the negative “secondary effects” of 
adult businesses in the community.77  Although the Court classified the 
ordinance as “content-neutral,” it, in effect, saved a content-based ordinance78 
through the cloak of the secondary-effects doctrine.79  
3.  The Content-Neutral/Content-Based Dichotomy as Applied to Nudity and 
Nude Dancing 
In City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., the Court was presented with an opportunity to 
clarify earlier cases addressing the standard applicable to regulations of public 
nudity.80  As a result of a city ordinance in Erie, Pennsylvania, prohibiting 
nudity in public locations, operators of Kandyland could no longer offer nude 
dancing unless the dancers donned some type of covering.81  The operators of 
Kandyland challenged the ordinance under the First Amendment, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the ordinance as an unconstitutional 
content-based restriction.82  When appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court, the Court observed that although nudity alone contains no expressive 
elements, nude dancing is a form of expression that falls just within the 
                       
 76. Id. at 46 (noting that significant to the Ninth Circuit’s decision was the fact that the 
government used evidence gathered by other cities in reaching its conclusion that adult movie 
theaters lead to negative neighborhood impacts). 
 77. Id. at 54–55 (upholding the ordinance as a “valid governmental response to the 
‘admittedly serious problems’ created by adult theaters”).  Furthermore, the Court remarked that 
even if the ordinance was “content-based,” it was still a valid regulation because it was limited to 
“time, place, and manner” restrictions.  Id.  at 46–47.  But cf. United States v. Playboy Entm’t 
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (holding that a law requiring the “scrambling” of sexually 
explicit channels did not pass strict scrutiny because the government did not meet the burden of 
proving that it was the least restrictive means of curbing secondary effects). 
 78. The ordinance was arguably content-based because it applied only to adult movie 
theaters and not to movie theaters in general. 
 79. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565–66 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) 
(basing his concurrence on the “State’s substantial interest in combating the secondary effects of 
adult entertainment establishments”).  See generally John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary 
Effects Doctrine, 60 ALA. L. REV. 291 (2009) (discussing the origins, applications, and problems 
of the secondary-effects doctrine). 
 80. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (citing Barnes, 501 U.S. at  
565–66). 
 81. Id. at 282, 284.  Dancers wearing “pasties” and “G-string[s]” were considered compliant 
with the ordinance.  Id. at 284. 
 82. Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 279–80 (Pa. 1998) (acknowledging the 
purpose of alleviating the negative secondary effects associated with nude dancing, but finding it 
inextricably linked with an “unmentioned purpose” of suppressing the “erotic message of the 
dance”), rev’d, 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
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boundaries of First Amendment protection.83  Nevertheless, the Court, in a 
plurality decision, upheld the statute, reasoning that public-indecency laws 
banning nudity are content-neutral restrictions that bear no relationship to the 
expression of nude dancing, and should therefore be evaluated pursuant to 
O’Brien’s intermediate-scrutiny test.84  The Court concluded that the city 
ordinance satisfied intermediate scrutiny because the government’s goal of 
decreasing the negative secondary effects of nudity was unrelated to the 
expression of nude dancing, and because the effect on Kandyland dancers was 
minimal.85  
Shortly thereafter, the Court reviewed another zoning ordinance restricting 
the location of an adult business in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 
Inc.86  In Alameda Books, the Court considered the evidentiary standard 
necessary to invoke the secondary-effects doctrine.87  In both stages of lower 
court review, the trial court and the Ninth Circuit both held that the 
government failed to offer competent evidence to show the required 
connection between locations of adult businesses and increased negative 
secondary effects.88  The Supreme Court, in yet another plurality opinion, 
declined to set the evidentiary bar at such a high level, concluding that the 
evidence of related secondary effects need only “fairly support the 
municipality’s rationale for its ordinance.”89  
Notably, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Alameda Books 
was related to the issue of using a tax to combat negative secondary effects.90  
Although he concurred in the judgment, Justice Kennedy cautioned against an 
over-application of Renton’s secondary-effects doctrine to the direct 
suppression of speech.91  According to Justice Kennedy, the government 
cannot combat negative secondary effects by implementing a tax on the basis 
of the speech’s substance even if the tax can be rationalized by reference to 
negative secondary effects.92  Justice Kennedy’s language suggests that the 
                       
 83. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 289 (plurality opinion); see also Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565–66 
(“[N] ude dancing . . . is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, 
though we view it as only marginally so.”). 
 84. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 289–90. 
 85. Id. at 293–94, 301–02. 
 86. 535 U.S. 425, 429 (2002). 
 87. Id. at 429–30. 
 88. Id. at 433.  The lower courts rejected the 1977 crime-pattern study on which the 
government relied to support its secondary-effects assertion.  Id. 
 89. Id. at 438. 
 90. See id. at 445 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the content of speech cannot 
be used as a basis for a fee or tax). 
 91. Id. (distinguishing between zoning ordinances that target speech’s secondary effects 
while “leav[ing] the quantity and accessibility of the speech substantially undiminished,” and 
those restrictions that seek to suppress the speech itself). 
 92. Id. (citing Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992)).  
Justice Kennedy further explained that even “[t]hough the inference may be inexorable that a city 
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judicially made secondary-effects doctrine does not authorize municipalities to 
prohibit unwanted speech under the pretext of combating negative secondary 
effects; rather, it provides a carefully delineated tool for decreasing negative 
effects when the cause is determined to be the actual content of the speech.93  
II.  THE “POLE TAX”: LAUDABLE GOALS, QUESTIONABLE METHODS 
A.  The Road to Court is Paved with Good Intentions 
In 2007, the Texas legislature enacted the Sexually Oriented Business Fee 
Act (SOBFA), which imposed a five dollar per-customer fee on businesses 
offering the combination of nude dancing and alcohol.94  Revenue from the  
so-called “Pole Tax” was allocated to sexual abuse prevention programs and to 
health insurance for those families unable to afford coverage,95 under 
complimentary provisions of Texas’s Sexual Assault Program Fund.96  
Although preliminary estimates projected approximately $44 million of 
revenue from the Act, less than half of that amount had been generated by 
August 2011.97  Nonetheless, the tax still has the potential to raise significant 
revenue, as there are reportedly 175 sexually oriented businesses licensed in 
Texas.98 
B.  Calling a Spade a Spade: SOBFA is a Differential Tax on a Socially 
Unfavorable Activity 
One sexually oriented business, Karpod, along with the Texas Entertainment 
Association (TEA), filed suit in the District Court of Texas in Travis County 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the constitutionality of 
SOBFA.99  The district court granted Karpod and TEA’s request and declared 
                                                    
could reduce secondary effects by reducing speech, this is not a permissible strategy. The purpose 
and effect of a zoning ordinance must be to reduce secondary effects and not to reduce speech.”  
Id. 
 93. See id. at 446 (explaining that ordinances of this type might be permissibly  
content-based, as long as the purpose is to decrease the negative secondary effects associated with 
the speech, and not the speech itself). 
 94. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 102.051–.056 (West Supp. 2011). 
 95. Manny Fernandez, Strip Club ‘Pole Tax’ is Upheld in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 
2011, at A10. 
 96. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 420.008 (West Supp. 2011). 
 97. Fernandez, supra note 95.  To date, only $15 million has been raised because many 
businesses refused to pay during ongoing litigation.  Id. 
 98. Bureau of Business Research, An Assessment of the Adult Entertainment Industry in 
Texas, at 11 (2009), http://www.ic2.utexas.edu/sob2. 
 99. Tex. Entm’t Ass’n v. Combs, No. D-1-GN-07-004179, slip op. at *1–3, 2008 WL 
2307196 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Mar. 28, 2008), aff’d, 287 S.W.3d 852 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d, 347 
S.W.3d 277 (Tex. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1146 (2012). 
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the Act unconstitutional.  The court held that despite its “laudable goals,” 
SOBFA was invalid under strict and intermediate scrutiny.100   
When the State appealed to the Court of Appeals of Texas, it conceded the 
statute’s inability to satisfy strict scrutiny, arguing instead that SOBFA was a 
content-neutral law that should be analyzed under intermediate scrutiny.101  In 
affirming the district court’s ruling, the Court of Appeals held that SOBFA 
may not receive the benefit of intermediate scrutiny as enjoyed by many 
zoning ordinances.102  Further, the Texas Appellate Court noted that “this type 
of differential taxation based on content is precisely the type of restriction 
warranting strict scrutiny.”103  The court’s concern over differential taxation 
schemes was rooted in the fear of suppression of undesirable speech solely 
based on content.104  The court’s specific apprehension of SOBFA was 
confirmed by the record that revealed that representatives from the state 
taxation department determined which businesses were subject to the tax based 
on content.105  Having determined that strict scrutiny was the appropriate 
                       
 100. Id. at *1–2.  The court found that SOBFA failed the strict scrutiny test because it lacked 
the requisite narrow tailoring to serve a compelling state interest.  Id. at *2.  Furthermore, in 
reaching the conclusion that SOBFA failed intermediate scrutiny, the court pointed not only to a 
lack of pre-enactment evidence linking negative secondary effects to nude dancing and alcohol, 
but also to the lack of any evidence supporting the proposition that a tax would compensate for a 
business’s individual contribution to alleged secondary effects.  Id. at *3. 
 101. Combs v. Tex. Entm’t Ass’n, 287 S.W.3d 852, 858 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d, 347 
S.W.3d 277 (Tex. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1146 (2012). 
 102. Id. at 859 (noting that prior case law analyzing zoning ordinances in the context of the 
First Amendment have limited applicability because of the unique nature of a zoning ordinance in 
comparison to other types of speech restrictions).  The court emphasized that although zoning 
ordinances typically receive the benefit of a lower standard of review based on their  
content-neutrality, a taxation scheme is a wholly separate, content-based restriction on speech.  
Id. at 858–59. 
 103. Id. at 860 (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115–16 (1991); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227–29 
(1987); and Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581–83 
(1983)). 
 104. Id. at 859–60 (referring to SOBFA as a “selective taxation scheme in which an entity’s 
tax status depends entirely on the content of its speech”). 
 105. Id. at 860.  The court noted that testimony revealed that the tax is not imposed uniformly 
to all entities offering nude dancing and alcohol, rather it is selectively imposed based on the 
Comptroller’s determination that the content as a whole “represents the ‘essence’ of live nude 
entertainment.”  Id.  A program specialist in the tax policy division testified to various ways in 
which the department determined whether a tax would be implemented.  For example, if an 
establishment that serves alcohol shows a play or a comedy show with nudity, the place would 
not be subject to the tax because “‘the main ingredient of the performance is not necessarily that 
of live nude entertainment.’”  Id.  However, “a bar hosting a ‘wet t-shirt contest’ or a bar at which 
bartenders periodically perform dance routines and become nude” would be subject to a tax.  Id.  
One auditor commented that she uses her own judgment when auditing, noting: “‘If it’s like a 
theater that puts on plays and concerts I would think that maybe this fee was not appropriate for 
them . . . [b]ecause the whole essence of the transaction to me would be for somebody to go see a 
play and not so much a sexually-oriented business.’”  Id. 
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standard, no further analysis was necessary to hold SOBFA unconstitutional, in 
light of the state’s concession.106 
C.  The Texas Supreme Court Employs the Secondary-Effects Doctrine to 
Justify a Tax on Sexual Expression 
After yet another unfavorable ruling, the State of Texas appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Texas, arguing that the ordinance comported with the First 
Amendment because it merely targeted the speech’s negative secondary 
effects.107  The Texas Supreme Court, considering the secondary-effects 
argument, conducted a careful and thorough analysis of recent jurisprudence 
relating to adult businesses and zoning ordinances, including Pap’s A.M. and 
Alameda Books.108  The court found that SOBFA was not aimed at controlling 
the expressive message conveyed by nude dancing, but rather was limited to 
the secondary effects of nude dancing combined with the consumption of 
alcohol. Therefore, the state supreme court concluded that SOBFA was not 
content-based.109  Once the Act was labeled a content-neutral restriction via the 
secondary-effects doctrine, the court held that SOBFA satisfied the 
intermediate scrutiny test articulated in O’Brien.110   
III.  REIGNING IN “SECONDARY EFFECTS”: THE TEXAS COURT’S 
MISAPPLICATION AND EXTENSION OF THE SECONDARY-EFFECTS DOCTRINE 
A.  The Texas Court Erred in Expanding the Secondary-Effects Doctrine 
Beyond Time-Place-Manner Restrictions 
In the abstract, the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in O’Brien of 
conduct that included both “speech” and “non-speech” elements111 similarly 
applies to the activity at issue in Texas Entertainment Ass’n in that it consists 
                       
 106. See id. at 864 (reiterating that the Comptroller conceded that the tax fails constitutional 
muster under a strict scrutiny analysis). 
 107. Combs v. Tex. Entm’t Ass’n, 347 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
1146 (2012). 
 108. See id. at 281–86. 
 109. Id. at 287–88 (“The fee is not a tax on unpopular speech but a restriction on combining 
nude dancing, which unquestionably has secondary effects, with the aggravating influence of 
alcohol consumption.”) (emphasis added).  Scholar Fred Berger referred to this type of negative, 
secondary-effects justification as the “incitement to rape” theory, which contends that 
“pornography arouses sexual desire, which seeks an outlet, often in antisocial forms such as 
rape.”  BERGER, supra note 9, at 134.  Berger’s response suggests that the causality premise of 
the incitement to rape theory provides an unfounded excuse for rapists, arguing that 
“[p]ornographic materials, by their nature, . . . are an unlikely source or means of altering and 
influencing our basic attitudes toward one another.”  Id. at 137. 
 110. Tex. Entm’t Ass’n, 347 S.W.3d at 288.  Addressing O’Brien’s second and fourth prongs, 
the court found that by providing at least “some disincentive” to strip clubs, the Act furthered the 
government’s interest in curbing negative secondary effects, and that the “minimal restriction” 
imposed by the $5 fee is “no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”  Id. 
 111. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); discussion supra Part I.B.3. 
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of both the “non-speech” element of being nude and the “speech” element of 
dancing.112  According to Justice Souter, nudity “is a condition, not an activity, 
. . . [that] expresses nothing beyond the view that the condition is somehow 
appropriate to the circumstances.”113  On the other hand, the Court has 
recognized nude dancing as having at least some, albeit minimal, constitutional 
protection in the First Amendment’s outer limits.114  
However, SOBFA differs from the prohibition against burning draft 
registrations seen in O’Brien because it is not limited to “regulating the 
nonspeech element . . . [with only] incidental limitations on First Amendment 
freedoms.”115  SOBFA is not a mere indecency statute limiting public nudity 
and thus incidentally limiting nude dancing, rather it is a tax on conduct 
because the content is sexual.116  As Justice Kennedy stated in Alameda Books, 
a legislative body may not hide behind the secondary-effects doctrine to do 
indirectly what it is forbidden from doing directly—that is, suppress speech.117  
Perhaps foreseeing the inappropriate expansion of the secondary-effects 
doctrine, Justice Kennedy stated: 
A city may not, for example, impose a content-based fee or tax. This 
is true even if the government purports to justify the fee by reference 
to secondary effects.  Though the inference may be inexorable that a 
city could reduce secondary effects by reducing speech, this is not a 
permissible strategy.118 
Similarly, in Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, the Court declared 
unconstitutional a county ordinance that set parade fees in accordance with the 
party’s predicted effect on the crowd.119  The Court rejected the argument that 
the statute was valid due to its concerns regarding the conduct’s secondary 
effects of hostile parade spectators, noting that “[l]isteners’ reaction to speech 
is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.”120  
                       
 112. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S 560, 581 (1991) (plurality) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (defining expressive conduct and noting that “[a]lthough such performance dancing is 
inherently expressive, nudity per se is not.”). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 566 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[D]ancing 
as a performance directed to an actual or hypothetical audience gives expression at least to 
generalized emotion or feeling, and where the dancer is nude or nearly [nude] so the feeling 
expressed, in the absence of some contrary clue, is eroticism, carrying an endorsement of erotic 
experience.”). 
 115. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. 
 116. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 102.052(a) (West Supp. 2011) (taxing only 
sexually oriented business). 
 117. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 445 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 118. Id. (citation omitted). 
 119. Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 124, 137 (1992).  The revenue 
was intended for the procurement of police and security to maintain public order.  Id. at 124, 134. 
 120. Id. at 134.  The Court further rejected distinctions between mere fees and outright 
prohibitions in this context: “Speech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can be 
punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.”  Id. at 134–35. 
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As applied to SOBFA, the alleged negative secondary effects associated 
with alcohol consumption and nude entertainment are also considered a type of 
listener reaction, purportedly caused by the speech.  Because “[l]isteners’ 
reactions to speech are not the type of ‘secondary effects’ . . . referred to in 
Renton,”121 SOBFA cannot be saved from strict scrutiny analysis by relying on 
its goal of minimizing sexual abuse. 
The secondary-effects doctrine should be limited to the realm of time, place, 
or manner restrictions;122 otherwise the judiciary risks sanctioning regulations 
that target the content of speech under the guise of illusory and innumerable 
negative secondary effects.123  SOBFA regulates neither the time nor location 
at which nude dancing may take place, nor the manner in which nude dancing 
may be expressed.124  It merely requires businesses that choose to participate in 
this type of sexually expressive speech pay five dollars per “listener” to the 
government.125 
In reality, because the secondary-effects doctrine does nothing to transform a 
regulation from content-based to content-neutral,126 it follows that its 
application should be limited to only those regulations affecting when, where, 
or how speech is conducted.127  Any other approach erodes the sole purpose of 
                       
 121. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).  
According to the Boos Court, had the ordinance in Renton been aimed at psychological damage 
caused by adult films, instead of neighborhood blight, then the Court would have categorized it as 
a content-based regulation targeting the direct effects of the speech on the listener.  Id.; see also 
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 591–92 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the Indiana statute banning public nudity on the basis of deterring sexual assault and prostitution 
was rooted in the spectator message received by the nude expression); Johnson v. Cnty. of L.A. 
Fire Dep’t, 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1437 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that the fire department may not 
rely on the secondary-effects doctrine to validate a ban on Playboy magazine as part of its sexual 
harassment policy, noting that the ban is directly related to the “emotive impact of the ‘sexually 
oriented magazines’”); Bushco v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2009 UT 73, ¶ 76, 225 P.3d 153, 174 
(Utah 2009) (Durham, C. J., dissenting in part) (arguing that a similar tax in Utah was “a reaction 
to a primary effect” and the secondary-effects doctrine was inapplicable by definition); Andrew, 
supra note 13, at 1198–1200 (addressing the impact of Boos and Barnes on the application of the 
secondary-effects doctrine). 
 122. See George P. Smith II & Gregory P. Bailey, Regulating Morality Through the Common 
Law and Exclusionary Zoning, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 403, 436 (2011). 
 123. See David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: “The Evisceration of First 
Amendment Freedoms”, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 55, 60 (1997) (arguing that the secondary-effects 
doctrine has been abused by legislators, in that it allows for the transformation of a content-based 
regulation into a content-neutral one as long as some secondary effect, however indirect, is cited). 
 124. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 102.051–.056 (West Supp. 2011). 
 125. Id. § 102.052. 
 126. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 573 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in judgment) (“[T]he abiding characteristic of valid time, place, and 
manner regulations is their content neutrality.”). 
 127. See Michael S. Fenster, The Harmful Sin Tax: Why We Shouldn’t Charge Extra for 
Drinking, The ATLANTIC (Nov. 15, 2011, 9:02 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/11/the-harmful-sin-tax-why-we-shouldnt-charge 
-extra-for-drinking/248133/ (“The purposes of sin taxes are generally twofold: to raise revenues 
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the secondary-effects doctrine: to permit regulations that keep core speech 
elements intact while substantially reducing the associated negative secondary 
effects at the same time.128  Therefore, the issue is not whether SOBFA is 
content-based, but rather whether it actually reduces the sexual abuse 
purportedly associated with adult entertainment facilities and alcohol, and 
protects and maintains the existence of the primary speech—the nude dancing.  
It is difficult to argue that SOBFA actually furthers the State’s interest in 
reducing sexual abuse by merely levying a tax on sexually oriented 
businesses.129  The Texas Supreme Court noted that SOBFA produced “some 
discouragement [from] combining nude dancing with alcohol consumption.”130  
However, “some discouragement” is minimal compared to the higher standard 
of furthering a government’s interest.131  A tax, by itself, does not eliminate the 
alleged secondary effects caused by the combination of nude dancing and 
                                                    
and to decrease the utilization of a particular product or activity.”); see also Smith & Bailey, 
supra note 122, at 437–38 (observing that ordinances previously saved by the secondary-effects 
doctrine “specifically and overtly regulated one type of speech and expression, that which is 
sexually oriented, and therefore . . . cannot be called content-neutral”). 
 128. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 445 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
According to Justice Kennedy: 
The challenge is to correct the latter while leaving the former, as far as possible, 
untouched.  If a city can decrease the crime and blight associated with certain speech by 
the traditional exercise of its zoning power, and at the same time leave the quantity and 
accessibility of the speech substantially undiminished, there is no First Amendment 
objection.  This is so even if the measure identifies the problem outside by reference to 
the speech inside – that is, even if the measure is in that sense content based.   
Id. 
 129. First, assuming a causal link between sexual abuse and strip clubs that serve (or the 
consumption of) alcohol, the five dollar per-customer fee is unlikely to cause patrons to cut back 
on their visits even if the strip clubs pass the cost of the fees onto their customers.  See Jordon E. 
Otero, Banking on ‘Sin’: Rising Taxes on Vice Make Vital Revenue Sources for States, WASH. 
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2011, at A1.  Second, even if the fee’s effect reduced strip-club patronage, the fee 
still leaves unaddressed the other material that, by SOBFA’s logic, has negative secondary effects 
just as likely to increase instances of sexual abuse, among other antisocial behavior, and that has 
far greater reach and appeal. See BERGER, supra note 9, at 148–49 (“Indeed, much of what is 
found in the media is immoral in that it is expressive of, caters to, and fosters attitudes which are 
morally objectionable.”).  And yet, according to Berger, obscene material has less impact on 
society than the substance of primetime television because “[p]ornography, when it does attract 
us, affect us, appeal to us, has a limited narrowly focused appeal,” which “tends toward short-
lived enjoyments, rather than any far-reaching effects on the personality.”  Id. at 149. 
 130. Combs v. Tex. Entm’t. Ass’n, 347 S.W.3d 277, 287 (Tex. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
1146 (2012). 
 131. Even if it is conceded that SOBFA is a content-neutral restriction, it fails to pass even an 
intermediate level of review.  Courts often do not allow the government to justify restrictions 
based on purely hypothetical or weak evidence of the alleged harm, and also subject the 
restriction to close analysis to determine if its application actually alleviates the alleged harm. See 
Stone, supra note 11, at 11 (footnote omitted). 
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alcohol.132  Rather, a tax is a tool to raise revenue, not a mechanism to reduce 
sexual abuse, and thus should be employed in a cautious manner.133  
Moreover, SOBFA does not operate in a manner that leaves the speech 
unscathed.  The Texas Court’s characterization of the impact of the tax on strip 
clubs and nude dancing as “de minimis”134 was not an accurate assessment.  A 
“de minimis” effect is one that is “so slight or mild that it does not rise to the 
level of constitutional significance.”135  However, attorneys for TEA estimated 
that more than half of the affected business owners could be put out of 
business by the tax—a consequence that is neither slight nor mild.136  If these 
businesses are forced to close as a result of SOBFA, the vehicles for sexual 
speech are eliminated and accordingly the speech itself is substantially 
diminished.  Although an effective means of reducing alleged secondary 
effects, this type of approach exceeds the secondary-effect’s doctrine’s 
permissible limits.137 
B.  The Secondary-Effects Doctrine’s Negative Secondary Effects 
A glaring consequence of the expansion of the secondary-effects doctrine is 
that it would enable the government to assert false motives in order to 
indirectly target undesirable speech.138  The threat is potentially  
all-encompassing because “[a]ny regulatory objective, no matter whether it is 
                       
 132. See Otero, supra note 129 (discussing one economic analyst’s view that sin taxes “don’t 
reduce the sin, they raise the revenue”).  The tax is not only allocated for sexual abuse prevention, 
but also for assisting low-income families in meeting health insurance premiums.  Tex. Entm’t 
Ass’n, 347 S.W.3d at 279 (“The first $25 million collected is to be credited to the sexual assault 
program fund, and the balance is to be used to provide health benefits coverage premium payment 
assistance to low-income persons.”). 
 133. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 347 (1819) (“A right to tax, is a right to 
destroy . . . .”). 
 134. Tex. Entm’t Ass’n, 347 S.W.3d at 288. 
 135. Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit Legislative Motive in the Municipal Land Use Regulation 
Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1988); see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 496 (9th ed. 2011) 
(defining “de minimis” as “trifling” or “minimal; and “so insignificant that a court may overlook 
it in deciding an issue or case”).  But see Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 
136 (1992) (“[T]he level of the fee is irrelevant.  A tax based on the content of speech does not 
become more constitutional because it is a small tax.”). 
 136. Mark Kernes, Texas Supremes Uphold Adult Club Entrance Fee, AVN (Aug. 26, 2011, 
5:24 PM), http://business.avn.com/articles/legal/Texas-Supremes-Uphold-Adult-Club-Entrance 
-Fee-445636.html. See Koppel, infra note 148 (reporting that Houston strip clubs now face a ten 
dollar per-customer fee, as they are subject not only to SOBFA, but also a local Houston 
ordinance). 
 137. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
 138. See Hudson, supra note 123, at 60 (“The secondary effects doctrine has become a 
favorite tool for government officials who seek to disguise content-based regulations.  
Government officials often claim that laws are not aimed at the content of the disfavored 
expression, but at certain indirect or side effects of speech . . . .”); see also Otero, supra note 129 
(noting that sin taxes are frequently aimed at ridding society of “socially undesirable” conduct). 
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inadvertent or deliberate, can constitute a secondary effect.”139  To date, the 
secondary-effects doctrine has been limited to sexually oriented speech in strip 
clubs,140 adult theaters,141 and adult bookstores.142  However, the acceptable 
list of traditional effects a government may target is expanding beyond the 
traditional conception of the state’s police powers.143  Furthermore, the Court 
has hinted in dicta at the validity of the secondary-effects doctrine beyond its 
application to sexually oriented businesses.144  As a result, the door remains 
open for legislators to use the secondary-effects doctrine as a “possible avenue 
of governmental censorship whenever censors can concoct ‘secondary’ 
rationalizations for regulating the content of . . . speech.”145   
                       
 139. Hudson, supra note 123, at 60.  Hudson notes the problems with the “expansive” 
secondary-effects doctrine, specifically that “all speech causes effects. . . . The secondary effects 
doctrine, a fertile ground for abuse, insidiously eviscerates free expression by allowing 
government officials to characterize content-based regulations as content-neutral.  In practice, 
government officials use the doctrine to silence expression they dislike.”  Id. at 61 (footnote 
omitted); see also Thomas R. McCoy, Understanding McConnell v. FEC and its Implications for 
the Constitutional Protection of Corporate Speech, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1043, 1048 n.31 (2005) 
(“It is difficult to perceive any limit on the applicability of this secondary effects doctrine since 
the government’s ultimate regulatory objective in every case of suppressing core political speech 
is the prevention of some undesirable effect of the message.  Direct suppression of the speech in 
and of itself is never the ultimate regulatory objective.  The ultimate regulatory objective is 
always the prevention of some effect that is expected to result from the message if left 
unrestricted.  Thus, it appears that the secondary effects doctrine, if taken seriously and applied 
broadly, would effectively negate all First Amendment protection for all disfavored advocacy.”). 
 140. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 142. See supra Part I.C.2; see also Bhagwat, supra note 13, at 796–97; William M. Howard, 
Annotation, Validity of Statutes and Ordinances Regulating Operation of Sexually Oriented 
Businesses—Types of Businesses Regulated, 21 A.L.R. 425 (2007) (providing a detailed overview 
of case law in the context of sexually oriented businesses). 
 143. See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Stripping Away First Amendment Rights: The 
Legislative Assault on Sexually Oriented Businesses, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 287, 300, 
325–26 (2004) (citing examples of asserted secondary effects held to be valid, ranging from the 
traditional harms such as declining property value and increased crime, to the more recent evils of 
public urination, tax evasion, and fraud) (citations omitted). 
 144. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“Respondents and the 
United States do not point to the ‘secondary effects’ of picket signs in front of embassies.  They 
do not point to congestion, to interference with ingress or egress, to visual clutter, or to the need 
to protect the security of embassies.  Rather, they rely on the need to protect the dignity of foreign 
diplomatic personnel by shielding them from speech that is critical of their governments.”). 
 145. Id. at 335 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see COX, supra 
note 65, at 49 (“Even without empirical studies it is safe to surmise that the chief danger to 
freedom of expression by the poor, the unorthodox, and the unpopular lies in licensing ordinances 
and other general laws that vest wide discretion in local authorities to maintain the peace and 
public order.”); see also Morse, supra note 3, at 194 (warning that “[p]roposed taxes on strip 
clubs, junk food, video games, sugary sodas, bottled water, and ammunition would bring with 
them all the traditional ills of sin taxes and would also confuse the appropriate role of the tax 
system with the improper role of government as social engineer”). 
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Consider the instance of Terry Jones, the pastor who, in March 2011, 
publicly burned the Koran as a symbol of anti-Islamic sentiment.146  Angry 
protestors subsequently attacked a U.N. compound in Afghanistan, killing 
seven, while similar protests the next day resulted in nine dead and at least 
ninety injured.147  Viewed through the secondary-effects lens, could a 
regulation have prohibited Jones from burning the Koran by citing to the 
imminent risk of death to U.S. citizens abroad? Such a regulation would no 
doubt be content-based, because the negative effects are consequences of the 
symbolic nature of burning the Koran.  However, one could argue that the  
secondary-effects doctrine would excuse this otherwise content-based 
restriction because it targets not the speech itself, nor even its primary effects 
on the listener, but its negative secondary effects of loss of life.  The use of the 
secondary-effects doctrine in this context exemplifies the risks associated with 
such an expansion.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The secondary-effects doctrine is undeniably gaining traction in free speech 
jurisprudence, as evidenced by an ever-increasing number of sexually oriented 
business regulations,148 most of which, if challenged, survived lower court 
review.149  Using the secondary-effects doctrine to justify a discriminatory tax, 
                       
 146. Kevin Sieff, Florida Pastor Terry Jones’ Koran Burning Has Far-Reaching Effect, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/florida-pastor 
-terry-joness-koran-burning-has-far-reaching-effect/2011/04/02/AFpiFoQC_story.html. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 311.710.1(3) (West 2011) (prohibiting “immoral or 
improper entertainment” on the licensed premises of intoxicating liquor); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 61-4-580(4) (2009) (prohibiting immoral entertainment when an individual is in a “state of 
undress” on a liquor license holder’s premises); W. VA. CODE. § 60-7-12(a)(2),(c) (LexisNexis 
2011) (making money from “obscene, lewd, or immoral, or improper entertainment” is a criminal 
misdemeanor); see also Nathan Koppel, Houston’s Strip Clubs Hit by New ‘Pole Tax’, WALL ST. 
J., June 28, 2012, at A7 (reporting that those clubs unfortunate enough to be located in Houston 
are now subject to a local five dollar per-customer fee, approved by the Houston City Council as 
a measure to fund rape forensics, in addition to SOBFA); Catherine Rampell, Sin Is Sure 
Lucrative, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2010, at WK5 (reporting that three “cash-strapped”  
states—Texas, Georgia, and Pennsylvania—have considered “pole taxes”); Laura Hibbard, 
Phoenix Considers ‘Sin Tax’ on Strip Clubs, Tattoo Parlors, HUFF. POST (Sept. 16, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/15/sin-tax-could-be-imposed-in-arizona_n_965004.html 
(reporting that Phoenix, Arizona, has considered taxing strip clubs and tattoo parlors to increase 
state revenue). 
 149. See, e.g., 181 South Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228, 230, 234–35 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(upholding N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:2-23.6(a)(1) (2005), which prohibits “lewdness” and 
“immoral activity” on premises serving alcohol); G.M. Enterprises, Inc. v. Town of St. Joseph, 
Wis., 350 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding Ordinance 2001-02, § 153-4 (2001), which 
prohibited the sale of alcohol on premises and any physical contact between performers and 
customers); Déjà Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 
274 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding M.C.L. §§ 6.54.090, 6.54.140 (1997), which conditioned 
licensing of sexually oriented business on compliance with no-touch/buffer zones and a fee of 
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such as SOBFA, is at odds with the Court’s view of differential taxation under 
the First Amendment, as the Court has previously stated that “a tax will trigger 
heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment if it discriminates on the basis 
of the content of taxpayer speech.”150  Until the Supreme Court addresses the 
specific parameters of the secondary-effects doctrine,151 its outer limits will 
remain uncertain.  However, the reasoning is not indefinitely linked to sexual 
speech alone, as the overall concept lends itself to application in a variety of 
contexts.  Although the doctrine’s application has thus far been contained to 
sexual speech, the judicial abdication exemplified by Texas Entertainment 
Ass’n may “set the Court on a road that will lead to the evisceration of First 
Amendment freedoms.”152 
 
                                                    
$500 for each license); Bushco v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2009 UT 73, ¶ 59, 225 P.3d 153, 157, 
171–72 (Utah 2009) (holding constitutional UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-27-101 (West 2011), which 
levies a ten percent tax on sexually oriented businesses), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 455 (2010).  But 
see Conchatta Inc. v. Miller, 458 F.3d 258, 261 (3d Cir. 2006) (striking down 47 PA. CON. STAT. 
ANN. § 4-493(10) (West 2005), which sought to ban lewd entertainment on premises licensed to 
sell alcohol). 
 150. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (“[D]ifferential taxation of First 
Amendment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress the expression of 
particular ideas or viewpoints . . . . A tax is also suspect if it targets a small group of speakers.  
Again, the fear is censorship of particular ideas or viewpoints.”) (citations omitted). 
 151. See Denali, L.L.C. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 131 S. Ct. 455 (2010) (denying certiorari 
on the issue of Utah’s ten percent tax on sexual businesses). 
 152. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 338 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment). 
